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ABSTRACT 
With declining budgets and consolidation in the defense industry, should 
competition between prime and sub-prime contractors be fostered through 
innovative lease arrangements, similar to the Navy’s TAKX (Maritime Pre-
positioning Force MPF) solution of the early 1980s?  This thesis will attempt to 
answer the following questions – To what extent do current financial and 
managerial policies affect leasing and would changing these policies benefit both 
parties?  Are there any benefits to leasing versus purchasing?  Could leasing 
help the DoD control its budget?  We will attempt to address the potential 
legislative action required to make long-term capital lease options palatable to 
both investors and DoD while allowing for continued congressional oversight of 
the procurement process. This research draws upon a multitude of papers, 
documents and other resources to deliver an acceptable answer to our question.  
The research presented will also attempt to identify where and why leasing can 
be a viable option to the acquisition process.   The research will also review an 
example where leasing has proven its effectiveness and continues to be an 
effective alternative to full up-front procurement in the acquisition process.  That 
process, however, was started and completed under earlier rules governing the 
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The United States Department of Defense (DoD) has relied heavily on full 
up-front procurement to finance its acquisition of military equipment since its 
inception.  Over the past 20 years, the budget, specifically the defense budget, 
has come under far greater scrutiny.  This scrutiny has resulted in additional 
legislative controls and monitoring on how the department spends its money.  
Gone are the days of the Reagan build-up where, intent on outspending the 
soviets in a great arms race, the DoD was allowed to purchase military 
equipment on grand scales for fear of the Russian hordes.  Nor is the DoD 
planning on large-scale battles with other great-state actors and winning those 
battles by overwhelming opposing belligerents with superior high-tech 
equipment.  Because of this, the military has become much more serious about 
how it spends its money and ensuring that they get the best equipment at the 
best price.  All while maintaining itself within budget.   
Now, faced with these continued budgetary pressures, decreasing 
purchasing power, and the increasing costs of specialized equipment to satisfy 
requirements of mobility and lethality, those in the acquisition process realize that 
in order to maximize value to the American taxpayer they need to change how 
money is spent.  The lease vs. buy question has been around for a number of 
years and the DoD prefers to own its equipment outright.  But due to rising 
acquisition costs and the difficulty of maintaining maintenance contracts, it might 
be more beneficial to lease.  Currently, purchasing is still the main avenue for 
acquiring equipment, but there needs to be another option to keep our fighting 
forces ahead of those who would do us harm in both mobility and lethality.   
Lease arrangements could allow shipyards, airplane manufacturers, etc., 
to keep costs down by fixing production quantities earlier in the process, 
spreading the research and development costs over greater quantities of finished 
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goods, and reducing the development cycle from five to ten years to two years. 
All while continuing to supply the requisite number of assets for force 
reconstitution and modernization.  These are contemporary issues that will help 
in analyzing the questions this thesis attempts to answer, and why it might be 
advantageous to keep the industrial base working at full capacity through a lease 
arrangement.   
B. RESEARCH 
This research draws upon a multitude of papers, documents and other 
resources to deliver an acceptable answer to our questions.  The research 
presented will also attempt to identify where and why leasing can be a viable 
option to the full up-front acquisition process. The research will also review an 
example where leasing has proven its effectiveness and continues to be an 
effective alternative to full up-front procurement in the acquisition process.  That 
process, however, was started and completed under earlier rules governing the 
lease of capital assets. 
1. Research Questions: 
• To what extent do current financial and managerial policies affect 
leasing and would changing these policies benefit both parties? 
• Are there any benefits to leasing versus buying?   
• Will leasing help the DoD control their budget?   
C. BENEFIT OF THESIS 
This thesis will provide a basic analysis of the current acquisition process 
as it relates to the lease versus purchase decision while providing the 
advantages and disadvantages of both options.  Each option does have tangible 
benefits and specific drawbacks but, because of the current economic situation, 
the DoD budget bears the brunt of the drawbacks and realizes few of the 
benefits.  This, in turn, effects how the military manages its acquisition program 
to stay ahead of those who wish to do harm to the United States and its allies. 
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Furthermore, this thesis will attempt to show that leasing does have its place in 
the acquisition of military assets and that leasing should be assessed as an 
alternative more often than is current practice because of its ability to save 
money, both in the short and long term, which leads to additional recapitalization 
for more pressing issues. 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a broad-spectrum look into the 
acquisition process with regard to the lease versus purchase decision.  It is not 
intended to show that leasing is or will be the most effective alternative in any or 
every case, but rather that because of its potential, leasing should not be 
discounted simply because of current legislation enacted as intentional 
impediments to the lease option for defense acquisition.  This analysis will 
contribute to greater awareness of leasing as an alternative to full up-front 
purchase by the acquisition force.  This heightened awareness will enable the 
acquisition workforce to achieve the noble goal of maintaining the highest 
standard of readiness with the most up to date military equipment for the men 
and women of the United States Armed Forces. 
D.  THESIS SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis is on the lease versus purchase decision and how 
capital-financing decisions could be made within the acquisition process.  
Specific budgetary requirements and fiscal policy in relation to leasing and 
purchasing are not addressed at length, but small portions of the process will be 
reviewed as reference. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis reviews the basic process of the lease, purchase decision and 
specific rules governing both leasing and purchasing.  It also attempts to show 
the advantages and disadvantages of leasing and purchasing while attempting to 
show that each has its place in the acquisition process.  It will briefly showcase 
an example of a successful acquisition program where leasing did work, 
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produced significant savings, and enabled the DoD to invest in higher priority 
programs.  There is still disagreement at the highest levels as to how much 
actual savings there was and where those savings were realized.  The resulting 
data was the product of in-depth research into multiple documents and other 
statistical methods. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
The research presented in this thesis is presented as follows: 
Chapter I, Introduction, discusses the benefit, scope and methodology of 
this thesis while establishing context in the basic process of leasing and 
purchasing.  It further discusses why leasing should not be ignored as an 
alternative to full up-front purchase in defense acquisition.  Rather, leasing 
should be viewed as a potentially viable option. 
Chapter II, Literature Review, provides a summary of all documents that 
reviewed to gain the information necessary to present a thorough and informative 
thesis. 
Chapter III, Budget Effects on Acquisition, provides background 
information on the annual defense appropriation process as it relates to 
budgetary effects on the acquisition process.  It also briefly discusses the 
competition that comes out of the acquisition process as well as the conflicting 
policies that arise because of this competition. 
Chapter IV, What is Leasing and Purchasing, briefly describes the two 
options in the acquisition process, leasing and purchasing.  It also briefly 
discusses reasons why purchasing has historically been the popular choice in 
defense acquisition and articulates some questions that should be asked when 




Chapter V, Advantages and Disadvantages of Leasing and Purchasing, 
discusses some of the advantages and disadvantages to both leasing and 
purchasing.  This chapter is not collectively exhaustive in that it only covers those 
aspects that are considered relevant to this thesis. 
Chapter VI, Rules and Restrictions for Leasing for Cost Effectiveness, 
briefly discusses specific legislation and budget policies that are meant to guide 
the lease analysis process.  It will also provide an analysis of these restrictions 
and what the government expects to see when the lease option is desired over 
the full up-front purchase of defense assets.  It will also discuss cost-benefit 
analysis in relation to leasing and purchasing.  This chapter will not delve into 
how to conduct a cost-benefit analysis or the process associated with leasing 
and purchasing. 
Chapter VII, Example of Lease/Purchase Decisions, gives an example of 
a successful lease arrangement with civilian investors for the acquisition of non-
combat related defense assets.  It will briefly discuss the Military Sealift 
Command program, its background, and why the Navy chose to lease rather 
than fund the full up-front procurement of maritime prepositioning ships.  It will 
also provide a short analysis of why it worked with supporting information. 
Chapter VIII, Conclusions, provides the final analysis based on related 
research and interpretation of others’ responses.  It will answer each question in 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  7
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents background information on a number of subject 
areas to build a framework upon which to discuss topics raised throughout the 
remainder of this thesis. Initially it explains capital decision-making as it relates to 
financing and rates of return.  The final section presents previous work related to 
the subject of this thesis as a basis for discussion regarding the efficacy of 
leasing as an alternative method of financing for defense acquisition. Additional 
background on defense budgeting and financial management was researched by 
the authors as necessary to understand where the issue of lease versus 
purchase fits into the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution system 
(PPBES) and the federal government budget process. Understanding PPBES 
and federal budgeting, especially how Congress budgets, was required for this 
project but is not summarized here. For background on this area see relevant 
texts including L. R. Jones and J. L. McCaffery (2008).  
B. CAPITAL DECISION MAKING 
1. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A–11 
(2008): Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget 
a. Appendix A – Scorekeeping Guidelines 
The term “Budget scorekeeping” refers to the process of estimating 
the budgetary effects of legislation, both previously enacted and pending, on the 
limits set in the budget resolution or legislation.  Scorekeeping uses several 
metrics to compare these legislative effects such as budget authority, receipts, 




Appendix A outlines the budget scorekeeping guidelines used by 
the House and Senate Budget Committees, the Congressional 
Budget Office, and the Office of Management and Budget (the 
"scorekeepers") in measuring compliance with the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974 (CBA), as amended, and GRH, as amended. 
The purpose of the guidelines is to ensure that the scorekeepers 
measure the effects of legislation on the deficit consistent with 
established scorekeeping conventions and with the specific 
requirements in those Acts regarding discretionary spending, direct 
spending, and receipts. ((OMB) Circular No. A–11 (2008)) 
The scorekeeping guidelines further delineate how purchases are 
to be scored based on their nature.  The following excerpt defines how each type 
of purchase (purchase, lease-purchase, capital lease, and operating lease) is to 
be scored.  
 
For lease-purchases and capital leases, budget authority will be 
scored against the legislation in the year in which the budget 
authority is first made available in the amount of the estimated net 
present value of the government's total estimated legal obligations 
over the life of the contract, except for imputed interest costs 
calculated at Treasury rates for marketable debt instruments of 
similar maturity to the lease period and identifiable annual operating 
expenses that would be paid by the government as owner (such as 
utilities, maintenance, and insurance). Property taxes will not be 
considered to be an operating cost. Imputed interest costs will be 
classified as mandatory and will not be scored against the 
legislation or for current level but will count for other purposes.  
For operating leases, budget authority will be scored against the 
legislation in the year in which the budget authority is first made 
available in the amount necessary to cover the government's legal 
obligations. The amount scored will include the estimated total 
payments expected to arise under the full term of a lease contract 
or, if the contract will include a cancellation clause, an amount 
sufficient to cover the lease payments for the first fiscal year during 
which the contract is in effect, plus an amount sufficient to cover the 
costs associated with cancellation of the contract. For funds that 
are self-insuring under existing authority, only budget authority to 
cover the annual lease payment is required to be scored.  
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Outlays for a lease-purchase in which the Federal government 
assumes substantial risk (for example, through an explicit 
government guarantee of third party financing) will be spread 
across the period during which the contractor constructs, 
manufactures, or purchases the asset. Outlays for an operating 
lease, a capital lease, or a lease-purchase in which the private 
sector retains substantial risk will be spread across the lease 
period. In all cases, the total amount of outlays scored over time 
against legislation will equal the amount of budget authority scored 
against that legislation.  
No special rules apply to scoring purchases of assets (whether the 
asset is existing or is to be manufactured or constructed). Budget 
authority is scored in the year in which the authority to purchase is 
first made available in the amount of the government's estimated 
legal obligations. Outlays scored will equal the estimated 
disbursements by the government based on the particular purchase 
arrangement, and over time will equal the amount of budget 
authority scored against that legislation.  
Existing contracts will not be rescored. ((OMB) Circular No. A–11 
(2008)) 
b. Appendix B – Budgetary Treatment of Lease-Purchases 
and Leases of Capital Assets 
This appendix provides instructions on the budgetary treatment of 
lease-purchases and leases of capital assets consistent with the scorekeeping 
rule developed by the executive and legislative branches in connection with the 
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA), as revised pursuant to the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 (see Appendix A). The scorekeeping rule focuses on leases 
and lease-purchases specifically authorized by law.  However, these 
requirements apply to all lease-purchase arrangements and capital leases, 
including those arrangements that agencies may enter into under existing 
general legal authorities and arrangements that are financed through the Federal 
Financing Bank.  The only exception is that leases between Federal agencies 
generally will not be treated this way if the lessor recorded the full cost of the 
asset when it was acquired ((OMB) Circular No. A–11 (2008)). 
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Also included in this appendix is a useful set of definitions that help 
the reader to differentiate between a lease-purchase, an operating lease and a 
capital lease.  The definitions in Appendix B go further in establishing some 
defining concepts that help govern the treatment of purchases in the budget.  
The following definitions are germane: 
Lease-purchase means a type of lease in which ownership of the 
asset is transferred to the government at or shortly after the end of 
the lease term. Such a lease may or may not contain a bargain-
price purchase option.  
Capital lease means any lease other than a lease-purchase that 
does not meet the criteria of an operating lease.  
Operating lease means a lease that meets all the criteria listed 
below. If the criteria are not met, the lease will be considered to be 
a capital lease or a lease-purchase, as appropriate.  Multi-year 
service contracts (e.g., grounds maintenance) and multi-year 
purchase contracts for expendable commodities (e.g., aspirin) will 
be considered to be operating leases. Agencies should consult with 
OMB in cases where a service contract requires a private 
contractor to construct or acquire a capital asset solely or primarily 
to provide the service to the government.  
• Ownership of the asset remains with the leaser during the term of 
the lease and is not transferred to the government at or shortly after 
the end of the lease term.   
 
• The lease does not contain a bargain-price purchase option.   
 
• The lease term does not exceed 75 percent of the estimated 
economic life of the asset.  
 
• The present value of the minimum lease payments over the life of 
the lease does not exceed 90 percent of the fair market value of the 
asset at the beginning of the lease term.  
 
• The asset is a general purpose asset rather than being for a special 
purpose of the government and is not built to the unique 
specification of the government as lessee.   
 
• There is a private sector market for the asset.   
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The following guidelines will be used in distinguishing between 
operating leases, capital leases, and lease purchases.  They should be used in 
calculating the term of the lease and the value of the minimum lease payments:  
 
• Estimate of fair market value.  In the case of real property, the fair 
market value should be based on current market appraisals.  If no 
asset exists, the fair market value of the proposed asset should be 
based on the government’s estimate of the private developer's cost 
to construct the leased facility.  The estimate should only include 
the costs the government would normally pay the private sector for 
such a facility.  These costs include the total direct and indirect 
costs of constructing the facility, including land purchase, design, 
site improvements, and management costs.  Fair market value 
should not include the value of features or enhancements that were 
built or added for the government's unique needs or special 
purposes or features or enhancements that will be paid for by the 
government in lump sum.  If the government proposes to lease only 
a portion of a facility, then the estimate of fair market value should 
be adjusted accordingly to reflect the portion that will be leased by 
the government.  
 
• Special features or enhancements.  Assets that have special 
features or enhancements that were built or added for the 
government's unique needs or special purposes need to be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis to ascertain whether they can 
be considered to be general purpose assets.  If the asset is 
considered to be a general purpose asset, then, as a general rule, 
such special features or enhancements should be financed up-
front, separate from the lease.  
 
• Projects on government land.  If the project is constructed or 
located on government land, it will be presumed to be for a special 
purpose of the government.  
 
• Renewal and purchase options.  If the lease agreement contains an 
option to renew that can be exercised without additional legislation, 
it will be presumed that the option will be exercised.  If the lease 
agreement contains an option to purchase at less than fair market 
value (at the time the option is to be exercised), and the option can 
be exercised without additional legislation, it will be presumed that 




• Cancellation clauses.  It will be presumed that the lease will run for 
the full term of the contract, and the minimum lease payments will 
be calculated on the basis of the lease payments that will be made 
over the full term of the lease (including options to renew).   
 
• Lease-backs from public/private partnerships. If an agency leases 
from a public/private partnership that has substantial private 
participation, the lease will be treated as a capital lease.  The term 
"public/private partnership" includes special purpose entities for 
which the government is a beneficiary.  Substantial private 
participation means (1) the non-Federal partner has a majority 
ownership share of the partnership and its revenues; (2) the non-
Federal partner has contributed at least 20 percent of the total 
value of the assets owned by the partnership; and (3) the 
government has not provided indirect guarantees of the project, 
such as a rental guarantee or a requirement to pay higher rent if it 
reduces its use of space.  Total value includes the value of assets 
contributed by the government (but not the value of land) and all 
improvements made to the asset.  Contributions by the non-Federal 
partner of cash, real assets, and loans for which the non-Federal 
partner is responsible for repayment will count towards meeting the 
20 percent threshold.  Direct loans from the government or 
guarantees by the government of loans made to the non-Federal 
partner or to the partnership will not count towards the 20 percent 
threshold.  
 
If a public/private partnership fails to meet the test of substantial 
private participation, the partnership will be considered 
governmental for purposes of the budget, and the lease-back will 
be scored against the agency that enters into the partnership.  
 
If the government ground-leases property to a non-Federal party 
and subsequently leases back the improvements, the lease will not 
be considered a lease-back from a public/private partnership, as 
long as the lessor is a totally non-Federal entity.  Such lease-backs 
may be treated as operating leases if they meet the criteria for an 
operating lease.  
 
• Bargain-price purchase option.  A bargain-price purchase option is 
a provision allowing the government to purchase the leased 
property for a price that is lower than the expected fair market value 
of the property at the date the option can be exercised.  The 
purchase price includes the value of any rebates or income to the 
agency or government resulting from its purchase of the asset.   
 
  13
• Property taxes. Property taxes, along with other operating 
expenses, will be excluded from the lease payments for purposes 
of comparing the present value of the minimum lease payments 
with the fair market value of the asset. (Note:  Property taxes will be 
included in the calculation of the net present value of the lease 
payments for purposes of scoring budget authority under the BEA.  
See section 2 (b) above).   
 
• Interest rates. The present value of the minimum lease payments 
will be calculated on the basis of Treasury rates for marketable debt 
instruments of similar maturity to the lease term (see section 4).  
 
Risk means the level of private-sector risk.  Lease-purchase 
agreements are scored as with or without substantial private risk 
depending on the level of private-sector risk.  Substantial private 
risk means the absence of substantial government risk.  Risk is 
defined in terms of how governmental in nature the project is.  That 
is, if the project is less governmental in nature, the private sector 
risk is considered to be higher.   
The following types of illustrative criteria indicate ways in which the 
project is less governmental:   
  
• There is no provision of government financing and no explicit 
government guarantee of third-party financing.   
 
• Risks incident to ownership of the asset (e.g., financial 
responsibility for destruction or loss of the asset) remain with the 
lessor unless the government was at fault for such losses.  
 
• The asset is a general purpose asset rather than being for a special 
purpose of the government and is not built to the unique 
specification of the government as lessee.   
 
• There is a private-sector market for the asset.   
 
• The project is not constructed on government land.   
 
Imputed interest cost means the financing costs that Treasury 
would have incurred if it had sold debt to the public equal to the 
total project cost. The difference between the total estimated legal 
obligations (excluding obligations for annual operating expenses as 
described in section 2(b)) and their estimated net present value 
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represents imputed interest costs. Imputed interest costs will be 
calculated at Treasury rates for marketable debt instruments of 
similar maturity to the lease term on the date the contract is signed. 
These costs will be considered mandatory under the BEA and will 
be shown in the same function as interest on agency debt, that is, 
in the function that provided the obligation authority to enter into the 
contract.   
Differential cost of financing means the total annual interest 
payments on any debt sold to the public less the interest payments 
that would have been made on the same amount of debt at the 
Treasury rate (i.e., less the imputed interest costs).  Simply stated, 
this corresponds to any interest above Treasury's interest rate.  
Asset cost means the present value of the agency's minimum 
lease payments discounted from the date of the first payment (or 
the beginning of the lease term, whichever is earlier) using the 
Treasury interest rate for marketable debt instruments of similar 
maturity to the lease term on the date the contract is signed and 
excluding obligations for identifiable annual operating expenses as 
described in section 2(b). Asset cost corresponds to the total 
construction or acquisition costs, plus property taxes and any 
interest above Treasury's cost of financing (i.e., the differential cost 
of financing).   See section 4 for more detailed explanation and the 
treatment of multiple deliveries ((OMB) Circular No. A–11 (2008)). 
c. OMB Circular No. A–94 October 29, 1992: Guidelines 
and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal 
Programs 
OMB Circular No. A-94 provides guidance to promote the efficient 
allocation of finite resources in the Federal Government.  It advocates sound 
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses for decision-makers and includes 
specific discount rates for determining the net present value of Federal programs 
where benefits or costs are distributed over time.  This set of guidelines also 
establishes the procedures for cost-effectiveness analysis related to lease versus 
purchase decisions, “Lease-purchase analysis is only appropriate after a 
decision has been made to acquire the services of an asset. Guidance for lease-
purchase analysis is provided in Section 8.c.(2) and Section 13” (Section 2). 
  15
Section 8.c.(2) states that for lease-purchase analysis –  
Analyses of nominal lease payments should use the nominal 
Treasury borrowing rate on marketable securities of comparable 
maturity to the period of analysis. Nominal Treasury borrowing 
rates should be taken from the economic assumptions for the 
budget. A table of discount rates based on these assumptions is 
presented in Appendix C of this Circular, which is updated annually. 
(Constant dollar lease-purchase analyses should use the real 
Treasury borrowing rate, described in the preceding paragraph.)  
(OMB Circular No. A–94 October 29, 1992). 
Section 13 provides amplifying guidance on the cost-effectiveness 
analysis of leasing versus purchasing the use of an asset.  It specifically requires 
that a separate analysis regarding the requirement to acquire the service be 
conducted prior to applying the special guidance in this section.  Section 13 is 
included in its entirety: 
 
Special Guidance for Lease-Purchase Analysis. The special guidance 
in this section does not apply to the decision to acquire the use of an 
asset. In deciding that, the agency should conduct a benefit-cost analysis, 
if possible. Only after the decision to acquire the services of an asset has 
been made is there a need to analyze the decision whether to lease or 
purchase. 
 
a. Coverage. The Circular applies only when both of the following tests of 
applicability are satisfied: 
1. The lease-purchase analysis concerns a capital asset, (including 
durable goods, equipment, buildings, facilities, installations, or land) 
which: 
a. Is leased to the Federal Government for a term of three or more 
years; or, 
b. Is new, with an economic life of less than three years, and 
leased to the Federal Government for a term of 75 percent or 
more of the economic life of the asset; or, 
c. Is built for the express purpose of being leased to the Federal 
Government; or, 
d. Is leased to the Federal Government and clearly has no 
alternative commercial use (e.g., a special-purpose government 
installation). 
2. The lease-purchase analysis concerns a capital asset or a group of 
related assets whose total fair market value exceeds $1 million. 
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b. Required Justification for Leases. All leases of capital assets must 
be justified as preferable to direct government purchase and 
ownership. This can be done in one of three ways: 
 
1. By conducting a separate lease-purchase analysis. This is the only 
acceptable method for major acquisitions. A lease represents a 
major acquisition if: 
a. The acquisition represents a separate line-item in the agency's 
budget; 
b. The agency or OMB determines the acquisition is a major one; 
or 
c. The total purchase price of the asset or group of assets to be 
leased would exceed $500 million. 
 
2. By conducting periodic lease-purchase analyses of recurrent 
decisions to lease similar assets used for the same general 
purpose. Such analyses would apply to the entire class of assets. 
OMB approval should be sought in determining the scope of any 
such generic analysis. 
 
3. By adopting a formal policy for smaller leases and submitting that 
policy to the OMB for approval. Following such a policy should 
generally result in the same lease-purchase decisions as would 
conducting separate lease-purchase analyses. Before adopting the 
policy, it should be demonstrated that: 
 
a. The leases in question would generally result in substantial 
savings to the government that could not be realized on a 
purchase; 
b. The leases are so small or so short-term as to make separate 
lease-purchase analysis impractical; and 
c. Leases of different types are scored consistently with the 
instructions in Appendices B and C of OMB Circular No. A-11. 
 
c. Analytical Requirements and Definitions. Whenever a Federal 
agency needs to acquire the use of a capital asset, it should do so in 
the way that is least expensive for the government as a whole. 
 
1. Life-Cycle Cost. Lease-purchase analyses should compare the net 
discounted present value of the life-cycle cost of leasing with the 
full costs of buying or constructing an identical asset. The full costs 
of buying include the asset's purchase price plus the net discounted 
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 present value of any relevant ancillary services connected with the 
purchase. (Guidance on the discount rate to use for lease-purchase 
analysis is in Section 8.c.) 
 
2. Economic Life. For purposes of lease-purchase analysis, the 
economic life of an asset is its remaining or productive lifetime. It 
begins when the asset is acquired and ends when the asset is 
retired from service. The economic life is frequently not the same 
as the useful life for tax purposes. 
 
3. Purchase Price. The purchase price of the asset for purposes of 
lease-purchase analysis is its fair market value, defined as the price 
a willing buyer could reasonably expect to pay a willing seller in a 
competitive market to acquire the asset.  
 
a. In the case of property that is already owned by the Federal 
Government or that has been donated or acquired by 
condemnation, an imputed purchase price should be estimated. 
(Guidance on making imputations is provided in Section 
13.c.(6).). 
b. If public land is used for the site of the asset, the imputed 
market value of the land should be added to the purchase price. 
c. The asset's estimated residual value, as of the end of the period 
of analysis, should be subtracted from its purchase price. 
(Guidance on estimating residual value is provided in Section 
13.c.(7).) 
 
4. Taxes. In analyzing the cost of a lease, the normal payment of 
taxes on the lessor's income from the lease should not be 
subtracted from the lease costs since the normal payment of taxes 
will also be reflected in the purchase cost. The cost to the Treasury 
of special tax benefits, if any, associated with the lease should be 
added to the cost of the lease. Examples of such tax benefits might 
include highly accelerated depreciation allowances or tax-free 
financing. 
 
5. Ancillary Services. If the terms of the lease include ancillary 
services provided by the lessor, the present value of the cost of 
obtaining these services separately should be added to the 
purchase price. Such costs may be excluded if they are estimated 
to be the same for both lease and purchase alternatives or too 





a. All costs associated with acquiring the property and preparing it 
for use, including construction, installation, site, design, and 
management costs.  
b. Repair and improvement costs (if included in lease payments).  
c. Operation and maintenance costs (if included in lease 
payments).  
d. Imputed property taxes (excluding foreign property taxes on 
overseas acquisitions except where actually paid). The imputed 
taxes approximate the costs of providing municipal services 
such as water, sewage, and police and fire protection. (See 
Section (6) below.)  
e. Imputed insurance premiums. (See Section (6) below.)  
 
6. Estimating Imputed Costs. Certain costs associated with the 
Federal purchase of an asset may not involve a direct monetary 
payment. Some of these imputed costs may be estimated as 
follows.  
 
a. Purchase Price. An imputed purchase price for an asset that is 
already owned by the Federal Government or which has been 
acquired by donation or condemnation should be based on the 
fair market value of similar properties that have been traded on 
commercial markets in the same or similar localities. The same 
method should be followed in estimating the imputed value of 
any Federal land used as a site for the asset. 
 
b. Property Taxes. Imputed property taxes may be estimated in 
two ways.  
 
I. Determine the property tax rate and assessed (taxable) 
value for comparable property in the intended locality. If 
there is no basis on which to estimate future changes in tax 
rates or assessed values, the first- year tax rate and 
assessed value (inflation adjusted for each subsequent year) 
can be applied to all years. Multiply the assessed value by 
the tax rate to determine the annual imputation for property 
taxes.  
 
II. As an alternative to step (i) above, obtain an estimate of the 
current local effective property tax rate from the Building 
Owners and Managers Association's Regional Exchange 
Reports. Multiply the fair market value of the government-
owned property (inflation adjusted for each year) by the 
effective tax rate. 
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c. Insurance Premiums. Determine local estimates of standard 
commercial coverage for similar property from the Building 
Owners and Managers Association's Regional Exchange 
Reports.  
 
7. Residual Value. A property's residual value is an estimate of the 
price that the property could be sold for at the end of the period of 
the lease-purchase analysis, measured in discounted present value 
terms. 
 
a. The recommended way to estimate residual value is to 
determine what similar, comparably aged property is currently 
selling for in commercial markets. 
b. Alternatively, book estimates of the resale value of used 
property may be available from industry or government sources. 
c. Assessed values of similar, comparably aged properties 
determined for property tax purposes may also be used. 
 
8. Renewal Options. In determining the term of a lease, all renewal 
options shall be added to the initial lease period. (OMB Circular No. 
A–94 October 29, 1992) 
2. Defense Acquisition University: Aircraft Leasing 101 – A 
Primer 
The Defense Acquisition University produced a primer on aircraft leasing 
to demonstrate the challenges faced by government entities when attempting to 
resource assets through lease arrangements similar to those found in the 
commercial aircraft market.  It makes the case for leasing in the commercial 
sector as one that benefits all participants in the endeavor.  First, the lessor is 
able to realize significant tax benefits by depreciating the asset over the life of the 
lease rather than the life of the asset pursuant to current tax law.  These benefits  
are passed on to the lessee in the form of lower operating costs, read lower 
asset capitalization costs, and reward both parties with advantages not otherwise 
available. 
Second, the lessee is able to tap into cheaper financing through 
consolidation and global capital markets, manage cash flows such that day-to-
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day operations fund the use of the asset over its useful life rather than financing 
the full cost of the asset up front, and enjoy significantly more flexibility in 
resourcing their fleet.  This allows smaller companies to enter the market with 
significantly lower start-up capital requirements since lease arrangements 
generally require 3% down whereas full, up-front financing requirements can be 
as high as 30%.  Furthermore, larger companies are able to explore cost saving 
measures such as downsizing aircraft or adding different aircraft configurations 
based on ever changing market conditions.  The Federal Government is unable 
to take advantage of many of these benefits because of the rules established to 
control the use of public funds.  The following summary of restrictive legislation is 
taken directly from the primer: 
 
• 31 USC Sec 1301  
− Restricts use of funds to the specific appropriation purpose, (i.e., aircraft 
acquisition funds can not be used to support aircraft operations or 
Operation and Maintenance funds can not be used to acquire even the 
smallest equity interest in an aircraft.) This effectively eliminates the 
government’s ability to enter into a lease arrangement on commercial 
terms. 
 
• 31 USC Sec 1341 
− Limits the government's ability to enter into obligations without the 
liability fully funded at the time of obligation, including contingent 
liabilities.  In leases, there are several contingent and other liabilities – 
future payments, termination liability, and indemnification – for which it is 
economical to fund only when the payment is actually due. 
 
• 31 USC Sec 1347 
− Requires an Agency to spend an appropriation only for the specific 
purpose for which it is appropriated or authorized.  It unduly limits the 
funding available to fulfill normal lease payment obligations. 
 
• 31 USC Sec 1502 
− Similar to 31 USC Sec 1347 -- Restricts the term within which an 
appropriation may be used to pay for the 'bona fide' needs of the period 
for which they were appropriate.  It unnecessarily restricts the source of 
funding available to meet lease payment obligations. 
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• 10 USC Sec 2401 (c) (1) and (2) and (f) 
− Restricts the ability of an Agency to obligate itself to certain contingent 
liabilities – i.e., termination and indemnification.  These contingencies 
are essential requirements of a lease arrangement that are the lessor's 
responsibility (Aircraft Leasing 101). 
C. LEASE AS AN ALTERNATIVE FORM OF FINANCING 
San Miguel, Shank, and Summers concluded that, “With a different 
legislative context and regulatory climate, leasing could be made potentially 
viable again” (Conclusion).  Their argument stems from an analysis of the Navy’s 
TAKX lease program in the early 1980s whereby the Navy, unable to secure full 
up-front funding for non-combat support ships, chose a lease arrangement to 
fulfill an operational necessity.  TAKX refers to specialized cargo ships with roll-
on/roll-off (RO/RO) and lift-on/lift-off (LO/LO) capability that provide up to a 
Marine brigade’s worth of equipment pre-positioned at strategic locations 
throughout the world.  This TAKX capability grew out of earlier successful pre-
positioning efforts in the Indian Ocean at Diego Garcia using older merchant 
ships (Page 3). 
Their analysis begins with a short synopsis of historical lease 
arrangements within the Navy that includes examples dating back to World War 
II.  Then the Navy contracted over 450 supply ships with merchant marine crews 
to support the war effort with further examples ranging from more than 200 ships 
during the Korean conflict to the T1 refueling tankers used during Vietnam (Page 
2). 
The foundation of the Navy’s decision to lease rather than purchase the 
13 cargo ships representing the TAKX program stems not from a financing 
decision for an already approved program but from a “lease or do-without” 
decision (Page 4).  In the early ‘80s, the Navy was growing its fleet to some 600 
ships as the Reagan era buildup against the threat of Soviet expansion provided 
the necessary impetus for defense spending.  This rapid expansion in combat 
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ships relegated non-combat ships to the wayside and Navy officials felt that 
defending non-combat support ships in the budget was untenable (Page 3). 
Leasing historically has provided several potential benefits to both the 
leaser and the lessee that due to changing legislation are now somewhat 
subdued.  One of the principal advantages to leasing in the commercial sector is 
the tax savings achievable by the owners of leased assets.  At the time of the 
Navy’s decision to lease MPS ships in support of the TAKX program, applicable 
tax code allowed accelerated depreciation of assets leased to non-profit entities 
to include the Federal Government.  This accelerated depreciation allowed the 
owners of the 13 MPS ships to fully depreciate the value of the ships over five 
years rather than the 31.25 years, or 125 percent of the lease term, required 
today (Page 23). 
The other tax related benefit cited by the authors is the Investment Tax 
Credit under which the private owners of the MPS ships could receive an 
immediate tax credit amounting to ten percent of the purchase price for qualifying 
assets (Page 11).  Much of the argument over the cost-effectiveness of the 
Navy’s TAKX program as it relates to the efficacy of the lease purchase question 
stems from these particular aspects of leasing.  Specifically, the loss of tax 
revenue afforded to wealthy investors at the expense of the American tax-payer. 
For DoD, Congress has erected several onerous hurdles that make lease 
financing for large programs particularly daunting.  The defense appropriation act 
of 1984 detailed the requirements as follows: 
• All DoD long-term leases must be specially authorized by law.  
• A notice of intent to solicit such leases must be given to the appropriate 
committees in both houses of Congress. 
• A detailed justification for lease versus purchase must be submitted to 
Congress and that justification must be approved by the OMB and 
Treasury. 
• The OMB and Treasury must jointly issue guidelines as to when leasing 
may be appropriate (Page 17). 
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Further restrictions followed with additional legislation that eliminated 
much of the benefit to private investors.  The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 
stipulated that assets leased to the Federal Government were no longer eligible 
for accelerated depreciation and the anti-deficiency act included provisions that 
mandate full up-front funding for the present value of all expected expenditures 
over the life of the lease to include early termination penalties (Page 17).  The 
final nail came in the form of guidance on conducting cost-effectiveness analysis 
out of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  OMB Circular A-94, which 
mandates the use of U.S. Treasury rates for discounting the present value of 
payments and benefits spread over a time, also restricts the use of tax revenue 
on payments to the owners in the computation of benefits accrued to the treasury 
(Page 18). 
To specifically authorize the TAKX program and the leasing of 13 MPS 
required Congress to waive certain requirements under the anti-deficiency act.  
The defense appropriation act of 1985 authorized the Navy to encumber the 
Naval Industrial Fund (NIF) only for the portion of the lease occurring in the 
current fiscal year plus ten percent of the potential termination fees.  Without this 
provision, the NIF would have been over-encumbered and the program infeasible 
(Page 17). 
The authors posit that for leasing to be a viable alternative to full up-front 
financing in the twenty-first century, the legislation effectively precluding the use 
of leasing needs to be re-evaluated.  Their argument follows: 
Tax Deductibility of Depreciation Expense:   The Economic 
Recovery Act of 1981 allowed companies to realize accelerated 
depreciation tax benefits over a very short time period.  Under this 
Act, the ACRS allowed the owners of the MPS vessels to 
depreciate their ships using accelerated rates over a five-year 
period, even though the lease terms were 25 years.  The present 
value of this depreciation tax shelter to the owners was over $72 
million per ship, a major component of the economic return.  In 
1984, the Deficit Reduction Act (P.L. 98-369) modified tax laws to 
disallow owners the use of ACRS for assets leased to tax-exempt 
entities, including the government.  The Legislation also reduced 
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the impact of the tax benefits by lengthening the tax life for 
depreciation to a period equal to 125 percent of the lease term.  
While this Legislation was not retroactive, if the MPS vessels had 
been built after 1984, depreciation lives would have been 31.25 
years.  This 1984 Act discouraged leasing by reducing the tax 
benefits.  But, the bigger blow was disallowing all depreciation 
deductions for leases to the government.  If the military hopes to 
foster an environment where owners desire to lease to the military, 
Congress needs to re-institute the ability of lessors to take 
depreciation deductions—at least on a straight-line basis over the 
ACRS life of the assets.  
NIF Encumbrance:  The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177) required all DoD agencies to 
request up-front budget authority for the estimated full present 
value of all capital lease payments and termination provisions.  One 
of the benefits of leasing in the commercial world is the ability to 
spread payments over the useful life.  If a private-sector user of 
equipment were required to pay 100 percent of the lease before the 
equipment is used, there would be no reason to lease.  The same 
concept applies to the government.   If the government requires its 
agencies to obligate the sum of total payments for the first option 
period plus the termination value (which virtually equals the cost of 
the total lease) then it will never make financial sense to lease.  In 
order to make leasing a viable option for the government, special 
legislation needs to be passed that frames leasing as an annual 
obligation, which does not encumber the NIF beyond one year.  
Prior Approval: The 1984 Department of Defense Authorization 
Act (P.L. 98-94) further restricted government leasing by requiring 
all long-term leases with substantial termination values to be 
specifically authorized by law.  It further required Congressional 
notification prior to issuing a solicitation for leasing.   Finally, the Act 
required a present-value cost comparison be submitted to 
Congress after OMB and Treasury Department review and 
evaluation.  Given the known aversion to leasing in OMB and 
Treasury, this law effectively eliminates serious consideration of 
leasing.  In essence, these three laws make it nearly impossible for 
leasing to be an effective alternative to purchasing.  This forces 
DoD agencies to use the full procurement process for all asset 
acquisition.  (Pages 23 and 24) 
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D. SUMMARY 
Based on the literature reviewed in this chapter, it may be concluded that 
lease financing has distinct advantages in certain cases over the full up-front 
purchase method preferred by Congress.  These advantages include lower up-
front costs since the cost of procurement is extended over the useful life of the 
asset, greater responsiveness to the needs of the war fighter due to dramatically 
reduced development cycles, and greater value for the taxpayer when 
commercial off-the-shelf items fulfill an operational requirement without 
significant development to meet military specifications.  Unfortunately, legislation 
designed specifically to guard against leases and the intentional or unintentional 
circumvention of the procurement process inhibit DoD’s ability to provide the 































III. BUDGET EFFECTS ON ACQUISITION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide information on the budgetary effects on 
acquisition process.  It will also look into the budget process itself as it relates to 
the annual defense appropriation processes and the competition that it fosters 
because of where each contractor is located and who is affiliated with that 
contractor.  A brief discussion of this competition and what pressure it places on 
the acquisition process along with conflicting policies that are created, which at 
times conflict with current acquisition policies. 
B. DISCUSSION AND BACKGROUND 
There are three principal budgetary effects on acquisition that bear 
mention; the budget process itself as it relates to the annual defense 
appropriation, the competition between must-pays and discretionary spending, 
and the policy objectives of differing administrations over the acquisition lifecycle.  
The first, the budget process as it relates to the annual defense appropriation is a 
complex cycle that involves every aspect of the legislative process and places 
significant pressure on a supposedly milestone driven system to adhere to a 
time-phased system.  The second, competition between must-pays and 
discretionary spending relates to ever-growing entitlement spending as a 
percentage of revenues creating significant downward pressures on all 
discretionary spending which includes defense.  Finally, each administration 
carries unique policy objectives that are often at odds with current acquisition 
plans and programs creating cyclical barriers for long-term sustainment of 
acquisition programs that may span multiple administrations.  This chapter will 
address each in turn. 
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C. BUDGET PROCESS 
Preparation of the annual defense budget for submission to Congress 
begins some 18 to 21 months before the start of the fiscal year in consideration.  
This preparation occurs within the framework of the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) and concludes, for budgetary 
purposes, with the Program Objective Memorandum/Budget Estimate 
Submission (POM/BES).  PPBES is comprised of four distinct yet overlapping 
phases and is executed in an on-year cycle (even years) and an off-year (odd 
years) cycle covering six plus one years. The first year is the current Execution 
year followed by two budget years and the out-years.  In on-year cycles, the full 
budget process is conducted resulting in a BES, conversely during off-year 
cycles only minimal program changes, adjustments, and fact-of-life changes are 
entertained and the resultant output is a Budget Change Proposal (BCP). 
1. Budget Planning Process 
The planning process begins with the promulgation of the National 
Security Strategy (NSS) from the President to the Department of Defense (DoD) 
through the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).  The DoD reviews the NSS and produces the National 
Military Strategy and the National Defense Strategy (NMS and NDS respectively) 
as well as the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), Joint Programming Guidance 
(JPG), and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 
The President is required under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to submit to the Congress an annual 
National Security Strategy with the annual budget.  The NSS outlines in very 
broad terms the international foreign policy objectives of the sitting president.  It 
addresses by statute the following: 
(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United 
States that are vital to the national security of the United States. 
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(2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national 
defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter 
aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the 
United States. 
(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, 
economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the 
United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the 
goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1). 
(4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry 
out the national security strategy of the United States, including an 
evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of 
the national power of the United States to support the 
implementation of the national security strategy. 
(5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform 
Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the 
United States. 1 
In setting the National Security Strategy, the president signals to the 
defense department what interests are to be addressed in the National Defense 
Strategy.  The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is produced roughly every four 
years and outlines the manner in which the Department of Defense will support 
the NSS.  It provides overarching guidance for strategic planning at the 
campaign, force structure, and acquisition objective level for subordinate 
agencies and informs the National Military Strategy.2 
The National Military Strategy further articulates the ways and means of 
achieving the goals established in previously addressed higher order documents.  
It is promulgated from the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with US 
CODE: Title 10 Section 153 as a report to congress outlining the military’s 
strategic plan consistent with of the National Security Strategy, the National 
Defense Strategy, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).3 
                                            
1 US CODE: Title 50, 404a (b). 
2 2008 National Defense Strategy. 
3 US CODE: Title 10, Section 153. 
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2. Budget Programming Process 
Each of the services conducts programming within PPBES in accordance 
with resource-constrained guidance provided in the output from SECDEF and 
CJCS.  Once the individual services have translated higher order planning 
guidance into actionable programs relating force structure, acquisition objectives, 
and infrastructure development to national objectives, the budget effort begins in 
earnest. 
The budget process covers two years in application but only one year in 
execution.  In on-years, the full budget process is carried to completion whereas 
in off-years the process is abbreviated and no new programs are added and only 
relatively small adjustments and fact-of-life changes are entertained.  Once the 
BES/BCP is completed and submitted to OMB for inclusion in the Presidents 
Budget Submission (PRESBUD) to Congress. 
Article I, section 9, clause 7 of The Constitution of the United States 
provides:  
[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence 
of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and 
account of Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be 
published from time to time.  
In effect, Congress holds power of the purse over the executive branch 
and exercises its power through the budget process. 
3. Budget Execution Process 
The congressional budget process was codified in The Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (the Budget Act) as a result of 
continuing efforts to reform and strengthen the role of Congress in the Budget 
process.  Each year Congress is mandated by law to set the level of total 
spending, how total spending should be divided among the 20 major functions of 
government such as defense, agriculture, and health, and the revenues required 
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to cover said expenditures. These functional spending levels are the sum of 
discretionary and mandatory spending for each fiscal year covered by a budget 
resolution.   
The congressional budget process results in various bills, including the 
defense appropriation, which are ultimately signed into law by the President in 
what is known as the Budget Cycle.  The process is both iterative and 
collaborative in that both the House and Senate reconcile and ratify the budget 
as proposed by the president with varying degrees of change over the course of 
the budget cycle. 
All members of the DoD, as well as the legislative and executive 
branches, program managers, and special industry groups are part of the 
acquisition process for defense.  In this process, special attention must be paid to 
key officials such as program managers, and their political and budgetary 
influences.  These individuals are the key ingredients to a successful program 
and whether that program continues to be funded each year depends on their 
successful defense of program requirements in the budget process.4 
Analysis of the historical tables produced by the Congressional Budget 
Office reveals several disturbing trends.  First, annual federal receipts have held 
relatively stable over the last 40 years averaging 18.3% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) over time.  Second, mandatory spending has increased by an 
average of 8.87% per year since 1968.  With receipts averaging 18.3% since 
1968 (Congressional Budget Office Historical Tables) and non-discretionary 
spending spiraling out of control to the tune of 11.9% of GDP in 2007 the 
downward pressure on discretionary spending is palpable.  The following charts, 
based on data from the 2008 CBO report to Congress, demonstrate the fiscal 
impact static receipts and dynamic requirements have on the annual defense 
 
 
                                            
4 Jones and McCaffery, 2008, 527. 
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appropriation.  Given historical averages for federal receipts and the inability to 
control entitlement spending, shrinking discretionary, read defense, budgets are 





Figure 1.   Compiled from data provided by the Congressional Budget Office 
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The budget is supposed to be a response to external threats as defined by 
the National Security Council, DoD planners, and the priorities of the President 
and Congress.  Unfortunately, this does not always occur.  Often, the budget is 
reactionary to unfolding events and passes too late to be effective.  It is this 
budget review and approval process that severely affects the acquisition process 
and the speed at which new programs can be started and fielded or existing 
programs incremented up, down, or abandoned outright.   
Because of the sheer size and complexity of the defense budget and its 
effect on specific constituencies, reaching an agreement on how much, where, 
and on what should be spent is always difficult in both the legislative and 
executive branches.  This delay tends to result in longer-term swings upward and 
downward, which make the acquisition process of military assets harder to plan, 
incorrectly budgeted, and initiates delays in execution.5 
Depending on the President’s budget, maintaining the acquisition program 
baseline for any given program can be very tricky.  Each new administration 
brings new policy objectives that may or may not mesh well with those of the 
previous administration.  Furthermore, each time an administration adjusts its 
policy objectives, the acquisition programs that support the preceding initiatives 
come under scrutiny and potential cancellation if their support for current policy 
objectives cannot be sufficiently well articulated.  This leads to constant cyclical 
skirmishes between competing interests over finite resources for inclusion in the 
budget. 
D. COMPETITION AND RELATIONSHIPS 
It is generally accepted that all relevant first order stakeholders want the 
DoD to spend more money on the acquisition of new programs because 
individual constituencies often represent the key beneficiaries of new programs 
that mean new jobs and increased revenue for the defense industry.  And, quite 
                                            
5 Jones and McCaffery, 2008, 529. 
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frankly, the DoD wants as much money as it can get to meet the current threat 
and develop realistic programs that support the future war fighter.  This of course 
is the rub; since Congress dictates, what money will be spent and where, the 
DoD never gets all it is asking for in some areas and more than it wants, or is 
ready for, in others. 
The one salient reason why the acquisition process, in relation to money, 
tends to increase over time is that no one has a grip on how much funding is 
actually needed in the long term for any given program.  Part of the issue relates 
to acquisition objectives – the number of assets required to meet a capability 
requirement – and the other relates to the maturity of technology associated with 
the program in question.  As acquisition objectives shift downward in response to 
restrictive budgetary pressures, the per-item cost for each unit procured rises to 
cover fixed development costs that were previously spread over greater 
numbers.  This fact often obscures any savings gained by reducing the 
procurement targets for a particular asset over time since the added cost of the 
remaining assets must carry the full cost of development regardless of the 
numbers produced.  Technological immaturity leads to exponential development 
cost increases since gaining approval at milestones ensures in the short-term 
that development continues without a guarantee of success in the long-term.  
This leads inevitably to “throwing good money after bad.” 
E. POLICIES AT ODDS 
The acquisition process, by law, is supposed to be milestone driven.6  
Unfortunately, the cyclical nature of the Congressional Defense Appropriation 
process forces the acquisition process for purposes of funding to follow a time-
phased process whereby decisions are made prematurely on limited information 
and biased estimates based on immature technology.   
                                            
6 DoD 5000. 
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Another factor that plays into an inefficient budget is the long-range 
projection of its acquisition base.  President Bush feels that FY2003 to FY2009 
and out-year defense acquisition spending plans would help the defense industry 
by providing concrete expenditures over a period of time.  What this has done 
however is draw concern from the defense industry in how that acquisition 
process is going to help.  For example, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
John Douglass, President of the Aerospace Industries Association, stated; “You 
can’t maintain a defense base on five ships a year.”7  Douglas and other defense 
representatives have made a series of distress calls on the issue, not only for 
their industry, but for the nation as well.  They submit that the United States 
needs a strong defense industry, which is prepared and ready to produce.  They 
also cited the reduced number of defense contractors, makers of major 
platforms, as a cause for concern.  
This lack of in house procurement could eventually hurt the U.S. strategic 
posture but is it the responsibility of the DoD to make sure the defense industry is 
thriving?  Vice President Dick Chaney as the former Secretary of Defense stated 
that it is not the responsibility of the DoD to maintain the defense industrial base.  
While true, the lack of a sound industrial base with adequate competition hurts 
DoD by raising acquisition costs for individual programs, reduces innovation in 
production efficiencies, and renders rapid build up in time of crisis difficult or 
impossible. 
The DoD budget and how it relates to the acquisition process is fast 
becoming a serious issue.  Many Congressmen, especially those with 
constituencies that are affected by this lack of procurement, have been speaking 
out on how the DoD is not spending enough and that the rapidly aging fleet of 
ships, subs, and aircraft will soon become obsolete.   
In an effort to try to fix the budget and save money, many proposals and 
policies have been debated and implemented to generate savings, i.e. the Base 
                                            
7 Jones and McCafferey, 2008, 530. 
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Realignment And Closure (BRAC) initiative.  BRAC was introduced to streamline 
and reduce the infrastructure of DoD in hopes of reducing overhead costs to 
allow capitalization of the modernization of aging weapons systems as a result of 
the expected cost savings.  This in fact has not happened, primarily because 
achieving any significant cost savings in the long term requires an up-front 
investment, which means more money tied up in infrastructure.  This up-front 
investment could have been used for high priority programs; instead it is being 
used for base closings and the elimination of military/civilian jobs because of the 
way DoD is mandated to spend its money through annual defense appropriation 
language.  
F. SUMMARY 
All of the above often results in the DoD re-sequencing its spending 
timelines or reducing the  planned acquisition objectives in successive Future 
Years Defense Plan’s (FYDP) and reprogramming other acquisitions to the years 
beyond the FYDP.  What does this mean?  The tough decisions and trade-offs 
that have been made now to fix the budget have pushed the major funding 
issues faced by the current administration and DoD to the future.  This future 
spending will actually be higher because of cost creep, inflationary pressures, 
and further deterioration of weapons systems that are facing higher than 
anticipated usage rates and dramatically reduced lifecycles.  This inevitable 
increase in requirements will necessitate a significantly larger investment in the 
future to pay for it.   
What it looks like now is that the cuts being made in today’s FYDP will 
never come back, particularly when taken in context of the continuing budget 
deficit and other major federal budget concerns with regard to entitlement 
spending.  How can the DoD acquisition program, the defense industry and 
military readiness be improved?  Could a change in tactics concerning our 
acquisition process, specifically leasing, be a part of the answer?8 
                                            
8 Jones and McCaffery, 2008, 53. 
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IV. WHAT IS LEASING AND PURCHASING? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will briefly describe the two alternatives available in the 
acquisition process, leasing and purchasing.  It will then go into a very basic 
synopsis of each of these processes beginning with purchasing.  It will then 
briefly discuss some reasons why purchasing has historically been so popular 
and the method of choice in defense acquisition.  It will also discuss leasing and 
some questions that should be asked when deciding weather to lease or 
purchase.   
B. DISCUSSION AND BACKGROUND 
In the acquisition process there are two basic ways contactors fulfill 
program requirements or supply equipment the DoD needs, through leasing and 
purchasing.  It is in this area, between leasing and purchasing, that the DoD 
acquisition process needs improvement, both in how quickly a need is fulfilled 
through the acquisition process and how that acquisition is funded. The DoD is 
mandated to buy American and, unless exigent circumstances prevent the use of 
U.S. based companies, DoD generally complies with this mandate. The DoD 
typically buys assets through the full acquisition process governed by 
Congressional oversight to fulfill its needs from contractors because traditional 
minds like to own what they are paying for. However, history has shown that in 
some circumstances it may be more beneficial to lease equipment because of 
the cost of recapitalization and the ability to minimize up front costs with a lease 
arrangement that spreads acquisition costs over the useful life of the asset.  Also, 
leasing places significantly more pressure on businesses to complete systems 
on-time, within budget thus allowing the DoD to have better control and flexibility 




The first, and most commonly used practice, is the full up-front purchase 
of equipment.  Which, like it sounds, is tantamount to any commercial purchase 
in that ownership of an asset is transferred to the government upon payment.  
The government often funds research and development for uniquely 
governmental assets that either have no commercial market or assets available 
in the commercial market are not suitable for military use.  This procurement 
process often involves billions of dollars, consumes many years of effort and 
attention, and frequently amounts to nothing in the end due to budget cuts.  The 
process always begins with a need.  Once a need is identified by the military, a 
call goes to the contracting office to begin a search for a contractor.  A 
contracting officer gets a consolidated list of requirements from the DoD and he 
then goes out and takes bids on what they are looking for from different 
contractors.  An extremely important part of both lease and purchase options is 
the list of requirements that are sent out to potential contractors.  This list needs 
to be as accurate as possible with limited opportunity to make fact of life changes 
because this will allow for not only a better product, but also a more accurate and 
dependable budget in relation to that particular program.  Once this list is 
distributed and a determination is made as to which of the bidding contractors to 
go with, a contract is then let.  Often contracts are separated into phases starting 
with research and development followed by production, delivery, and 
maintenance.  
1. Contracting Flaws 
When DoD contracts to purchase equipment, the contract usually goes to 
the least cost bidder; however, that is not always the best case because 
sometimes there are few bidders.  Consolidation in the defense industrial base 
has resulted in industries where only one or two companies compete for defense 
contracts, which limits the selection process.  If a contractor cannot provide 
exactly what DoD is looking for, but can provide something similar at a very 
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cheap price, sometimes DoD will take the cheaper one and make due.  What the 
DoD has realized is that this is a flawed way of thinking because in the long run 
the DoD ends up spending infinitely more money trying to resolve the problems 
they initially agreed to leave out.  Also, when DoD buys its equipment, a 
significant amount of money is required up front to cover all of the Research 
Development Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) for the program to the contractor 
just to start the development, which is money that has no immediate return.  This 
process leads to cost overruns prior to production because these contractors 
usually take on more then they can handle and require additional capital 
downstream to meet their deadlines.  This is another flaw in the acquisition 
process that has been shown historically through many problem programs and 
their funding.  What generally happens is that this RDT&E money is paid up front 
to the contractors and then, inevitably, something happens, (added requirement 
inputs, technological limitations, reduced numbers of end units, etc…), and more 
costs are incurred that exceed the budgeted amount.  DoD is then forced, if it 
wishes to keep the program alive, to reprogram funds from other lower priority 
programs or go back to Congress and ask for more money.  This is an extremely 
simplified model of the acquisition process, but for this case it is all that is 
needed. 
What purchasing has amounted to, for many capital asset acquisition 
programs, is a flawed acquisition process that has done nothing but force the 
DoD to review, renew, and reprogram repeatedly.  However, one must remember 
that this is, and has been, the way of doing business for years – even with all the 
acquisition reform.  For an extended period of time, the United States has known 
what needed to be bought because enemies and their capabilities were well 
understood. DoD knew where the things that were bought would be used, how 
long they would be needed, for what purpose, in what operating environment, 
and what personnel skills would be required to use and maintain them. The 
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situation was very clear and accepted by almost everyone.9  It is because of this 
that buying was not a concern and the availability of money to support it was and 
is a critical but not an entirely uncertain factor in obtaining assets.  The key 
variable appears to have been whether the President as Commander-in-Chief 
has proposed and supported plans and appropriations for DoD acquisition. While 
Congress always formulates its own budget, generally since World War II, 
Congress has followed the President's lead in funding defense acquisition 
through purchase of assets. A mindset of stocking up on equipment, personnel, 
and other supporting services is well defined and highly present in the DoD 
acquisition process and culture. However, with our nation's ever changing 
security needs and the globalization and threat that has emerged from selected 
third world countries, leasing and purchasing should be looked at more closely to 
evaluate whether and when it is the most cost-effective option. 
2. The Need for Competition 
With the above in mind, purchasing has proven to be more process than 
product.10 This process forces contractors to compete against each other to 
provide the best price that creates nothing but a starting point from which the 
contractors tabulate the final bill.  The contractors know that if they win the bid 
they can and will raise the price with the full knowledge that the DoD will not 
cancel the contract because if they do it will affect the troops, something they 
don’t want to try and defend.  It is common knowledge that very few programs 
actually get cancelled, just reprogrammed to meet monetary demands.   
Additionally, when developing new weapons systems, when prototypes 
are required, and when fact of life changes to meet ever increasing technological 
advances are added to requirements the timelines consistently get pushed back 
and delivery dates are often not met as advertised.  The acquisition process has 
                                            
9 Value, Cost, Obsolescence Contract for Change, Challenges Ahead:  Michael L. Tompkins, 
DAU website, 2. 
10 Jones and McCaffery, 2008, 650 - 651. 
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had many reforms and policy changes over the last half century all of which were 
intended to smooth the process to allow for quicker delivery of important and 
sorely needed equipment.  This, in fact, has not been the case; the same old 
bureaucratic machine with its complex, ill-defined political process still exists.  In 
other words, too many government officials believe they know what is best for the 
military based on what their district or state needs.  Combine that with the fact 
that each administration gives different guidance to the DoD and the result is 
confusion and budgetary problems.  Leasing is an option that could in some 
circumstances help smooth out the peaks and valleys in today’s ever changing 
defense acquisition environment by improving the budget and acquisition 
processes, shortening fielding times, and generating cost savings by spending 
less to gain more. 
D. LEASING 
The basic definition of a lease conveys part of an asset (such as part of a 
building) from one party (the leaser) to another party (the lessee) for a specified 
period in return for rent or other compensation.  There are two basic types of 
leases dependant on the type of contract, operation leases and capital leases. 
1. Operating Leases 
Operation leases, or true leases, do not involve the lessee obtaining 
ownership of the equipment that it is leasing.  The vendor or owner retains 
ownership of the equipment and the lessee obtains the use of the technology for 
a specified amount of time.  An operating lease for the government must also 
meet a set of standards set by a Government Accounting Standards Board.  If 
these requirements are not met, the lease is considered a lease-purchase and 
the equipment must be capitalized.  Also, an operating lease gets its money from 
the Operations & Maintenance (O&M) fund, which is a different pot of money 
then the capital lease.   
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2. Capital Leases 
Lease-purchase or capital leases are the second type of leasing.  This 
type of leasing is an agreement that spreads the terms of the payment for the 
equipment over an extended period of time.  At the end of this payment period 
and in accordance with the lease agreement, the purchaser or lessee obtains title 
to the equipment by purchasing the equipment outright.  What this type of lease 
has done, is allow the purchaser to spread out a significant amount of the cost of 
the equipment over its useful life.  Also, low interest rates can and usually are 
charged to these leases if they are large in nature.  Lastly, the funds that it 
receives are from the actual procurement process, so it is monitored with more 
scrutiny.    
3. Some Questions that Should be Asked when Deciding to 
Lease or Buy 
Now that the two basic types of leases have been defined, some 
additional considerations related to leasing may be assessed.  When considering 
a lease decision makers have to ask whether to purchase the equipment at the 
conclusion of the lease.  This is a case-by-case evaluation of comparative costs 
and other factors and must be taken seriously to be effective.  The factors to be 
considered are as follows: 
1) Length of equipment lease and extent of use 
2) Financial & operational advantages of alternative types/makes of 
equipment. 
3) Cumulative rental payments for estimated period of use. 
4) Net purchase price. 
5) Transportation and installation costs. 
6) Maintenance and other service costs. 
7) Potential obsolescence of equipment because of imminent 
technological improvements. 11 
                                            
11 Morgan, 2005, 4. 
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All of the above issues are the main factors when considering whether to 
lease or buy.  There are also some additional factors that should be considered 
depending on the type, cost, complexity, and estimated period of use of the 
equipment: 
1) Availability of purchase options. 
2) Potential use by other agencies after it use by the acquiring agency 
is ended. 
3) Disposition costs. 
4) Trade-in or salvage value. 
5) Availability of servicing especially for highly complex equipment; 
e.g. can the equipment be serviced by the government or other 
sources if it is purchased? 
6) Imputed Interest (Assumed or estimated interest when the actual 
interest amount is unknown/not stated). 12 
Looking at all these factors can be daunting, but these factors are there to 
ensure that if the government chooses to lease, that the decision was made 
fairly, with integrity, and with the best interest of the DoD and its personnel in 
mind.  Typical leases that the DoD has used and continues to use now are those 
for copiers, printers, fax machines, and IT (Information Technology) type items.  
The basic rule of thumb used by the DoD now is that the purchase method is 
appropriate if the equipment will be used beyond the point in time when the 
cumulative leasing costs exceed the purchase costs.  An example of this, buying 
IT equipment and its cumulative payments versus purchasing the equipment, as 
shown in enclosure (1) 13 will help in defining the leasing exceeding buying 
concept.  This small-scale example can be extended and applied in the context 
of larger real-world capitalization plans. 
 
                                            
12 Morgan, 2005, 5. 
13 Morgan, 2005, 7. 
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It may be seen that leasing this equipment generates a $45,000 cost 
savings in the first month.  This savings can be used for other investments or 
higher priority programs. After a year, leasing costs begin to overtake the initial 
purchase price further muddying the waters.  What must be kept in mind with 
something like IT is that in IT, constant turnover is required to remain competitive 
and up to date so that the initial investment of $50,000 is probably unrealistic.  IT 
further requires technical support and creates other problems that usually occur 
with IT type items.  When the choice falls to the lease option the wording of the 
contract must allow for this updating as well as the technical support because the 
owners/lessor will not allow the system to be operated without professional 
servicing.  These items are typically not included in the buy option unless it is 
specifically stated in the contract.  However, it should be stated that agencies 
should not rule out the purchase method of equipment acquisition in favor of 
leasing merely because of the possibility that future technological advances 
might make the selected equipment less desirable, even though this is essential 
in today’s quickly changing threat environment. 
E. SUMMARY 
In summary, the lease, purchase decision is an important one that must 
be made after exhaustive research and a thorough understanding of the pros and 
cons of each option.  Because DoD has such significant experience with 
financing acquisition through the full up-front purchase, the age-old saying of 
“that is how we have always done it” is germane.  Now this was not a bad way of 
doing business 20 years ago with a strong economy and a known enemy.  These 
circumstances made purchasing in bulk the way to go to secure our future as 
well as our allies.  Specifically for purchasing, it is appropriate if the equipment 
will be used beyond the point in time when cumulative leasing costs exceed the 
purchase costs, assuming that the complete purchasing costs to include 
upgrades and maintenance over the life of the purchase are known.  Leasing on 
the other hand is relatively new and because it is new it does not have the 
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support of most government officials who still see the need for actually owning 
the equipment.  Leasing has many benefits that should be looked at and 
considered.  Specifically, because of today’s changing threats and the need for a 
more reactive military because of globalization of third world countries, leasing 
could be more beneficial for a lot of programs.  Leasing should be done when it is 
to the advantage of the government, primarily if equipment is required 
immediately to meet program goals that are not supported by purchasing 
equipment.  Also, leasing could allow for reduced overhead and operating 
expenses as well as reducing the need for long-term storage because of the 
responsibility of the manufacturer/owner for disposal.  If leasing is the choice 
selected, then a lease with the option to purchase is preferable.  This preference 
for lease-option terms resonates because long-term leases without this option 
generally result in costs that typically exceed that of purchasing.  If the lease-
purchase option is used, then the contract must state the purchase price or 
provide a formula from which the purchase price will be derived if the lessee 
chooses to execute the option. 14 
In short, as long as DoD continues on the path of business-as-usual, using 
the same old acquisition system of organic ownership preferred over contracted 
service and leasing, it runs the risk of tying up national resources in unneeded 
assets. After years of waging the Cold War, regulations, organizational 
structures, training, and the methods of acquisition and decision-making are 
clearly in favor of doing business in the same old way.  This must change for the 
process to become better and our military to stay relevant and effective.15 
 
                                            
14 Morgan, 2005, 15. 
15 Value, Cost, Obsolescence Contract for Change, Challenges Ahead: Michael L. Tompkins, 
DAU website, 7. 
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V. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF LEASING AND 
PURCHASING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces some of the advantages and disadvantages of 
both leasing and purchasing.  It is not collectively exhaustive in its discussion of 
advantages and disadvantages, but treats only those that are relevant to this 
topic.  There are certainly more disadvantages that could be attributed to either 
leasing or purchasing, but these are not looked at specifically in this section.  It is 
the evaluation of leasing as a whole based on politics and time that provides the 
basis for discussion because, from the perspective of this research project, these 
are the critical factors.   
B. DISCUSSION AND BACKGROUND 
The previous chapter presented a short comparison of leasing versus 
purchasing equipment in terms of its relevance to defense acquisition.  There are 
many factors involved in determining whether the lease or purchase option is 
more advantageous to the government.  The discussion here begins with some 
specific instances of advantages and disadvantages to leasing and purchasing 
that have been realized over the last few years.  There are probably many more 
advantages and disadvantages plainly visible to the casual observer that are 
dependant on the specifics of individual opinion and how various contracts were 
written.  The decision over whether to purchase, lease or lease-purchase must 
be made according to DoD assumptions regarding how the asset will be used 
and for how long.  Advantages and disadvantages should be weighed against all 
other factors being assessed according to established priorities after determining 
which are most important to the DoD. 
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Three items that form the basis of any discussion regarding the lease 
purchase decision are the utility value, investment cost, and period before 
obsolescence.  This system of measurement has been around for some time and 
though it has been used, some might say that it is not used enough or given 
enough weight.  The following is a more in-depth discussion of each 
measurement element with some associate questions that guide an official when 
deciding whether to buy or lease. 
Utility Value: 
How useful is the total system including its equipment, facilities and 
people?  Does it have many other applications, or is its value 
limited to narrow parameters requiring specific threats or 
operational applications and environments?  What about the 
equipment needed to field it?  Can any of it be used or modified to 
support other systems, thereby increasing their own utility value?  
What about the utility value of the people required for operation and 
maintenance.  Aren’t they and their training a part of this system’s 
acquisition?16 
Investment Cost: 
Is the system expensive, in real terms, considering its total cost 
including its people and their training?  If a new building must be 
built to house the new system and its people, isn’t the cost of that 
building part of the system’s cost, too?  What about the investment 
in repair parts, their handling and repair and storage equipment to 
stock them, and all the other related expenses involved in the 
system’s acquisition, including new transportation vehicles and 
security requirements?17 
Period before Obsolescence: 
What if it is likely that a smaller, simpler and more portable system 
will come along at a lower cost to buy and operate?  After all, we 
                                            
16 Value, Cost, Obsolescence Contract for Change, Challenges Ahead:    Michael L. 
Tompkins, DAU website, 3. 
17 Value, Cost, Obsolescence Contract for Change, Challenges Ahead:    Michael L. 
Tompkins, DAU website, 3. 
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are talking about a relatively new and changing technology in 
almost every aspect of today’s military.18 
With these measurements and basic questions, the analysis of the 
decision begins.  After determining the value of each system relative to the utility 
value, investment cost, and period before obsolescence the comparison of 
specific advantages and disadvantages of buying to leasing become apparent.   
C. PURCHASING ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
Our nation’s posture over the last 40 plus years of defense acquisition has 
focused on fighting large land or sea battles with great-state actors.  Equipping 
the force according to this focus has led to a procurement process resulting in 
mountains of equipment.  Within the process there is a system in place that has 
worked well, albeit slowly and often unresponsive to real-world changes, the full 
up-front purchase of facilities and equipment.  In addition, because of this focus 
on the full up-front purchase of facilities and equipment, complex management 
systems have evolved to enable oversight of these large programs.  Another 
reason purchasing enjoys its "king-of-the-hill" status is that when assets are 
purchased, the complexities involved with managing lease agreements over time 
and the inevitable discourse regarding who has responsibility for what are 
negated.  The final and major advantage for full up-front procurement is that once 
purchased, the equipment may be kept in service for as long as it is needed.  
The equipment belongs to the government and the government can do with it as 
it wills.  That means modifications, changing roles, and adapting equipment to 
suite evolving purposes without looking for permission from the owner/lessor.   
The principal disadvantages to purchasing hinge on the fact that 
ownership and risk are transferred completely to the government upon receipt of 
funds.  The first disadvantage to purchasing is that it hinders the DoD’s ability to 
take advantage of technological advances as they occur.  Technology today is 
                                            
18 Value, Cost, Obsolescence Contract for Change, Challenges Ahead: Michael L. Tompkins, 
DAU website, 3. 
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changing at an exponential pace so fast, in fact, that by the time a purchase 
decision is made, the technology supporting that decision is often already 
obsolete.  If DoD purchases some new state of the art equipment, the odds of it 
being state of the art in a year are slim to none even when that equipment was 
developed specifically for the DoD according to military specifications.  In the 
ever changing threat environment faced by today’s military, the requirement to 
stay ahead of those who would do us harm is undeniable.  Without the flexibility 
to quickly update our equipment, the enemy, whoever they might be, could find 
gaps in our ability to protect ourselves.  
Second, because ownership and risk are passed wholly to the government 
at transfer, purchasing ties the hands of DoD when it comes to meeting emerging 
technology.  This goes back to the technology factor and the fact that as 
technology evolves, adapting older systems to interface with more modern 
systems requires expensive upgrades or results in additional purchases prior to 
the end of the expected life of the equipment in question.  Essentially, if that 
equipment does indeed become out of date or obsolete, then the government is 
stuck with costly upgrades or outright replacement.  
This leads to the third disadvantage; purchasing equipment passes the 
cost of disposal to the government as well as the risk and ownership of that now 
obsolete equipment.  The government must pay whether it decides to keep this 
equipment stored for some future contingency, maintains it in service in spite of 
its obsolescence, or disposes of it in accordance with environmental regulations. 
In some cases this obsolete equipment can be sold to foreign governments, but 
foreign military sales is no overnight evolution.  It involves many levels of 
bureaucracy, political connections, and often a high degree of congressional 
oversight.  Once the decision to sell or dispose has been made, which can take 
years, the cost for storing and maintaining the equipment is a significant portion 




other programs or recapitalization of current equipment.  Leasing, on the other 
hand, would have provided the government with an option, just give it back at the 
end of the term.  
Another disadvantage to the full up-front purchase is its effect on the 
budget itself.  The defense budget is severely affected by purchase delays 
associated with the procurement process.  As delays mount, so does the cost of 
the program being funded.  Furthermore, because of capital-intensive 
expenditures associated with increasing the life-cycle of obsolete equipment the 
program is expected to replace the delays produce a cumulative effect that can 
not be overstated.  As an example, consider the CH-46 medium lift helicopter in 
the Marine Corps.  For years the Marine Corps sought to replace the aging CH-
46 with the V-22 Osprey, a tilt-rotor aircraft that better supports its doctrine of 
operational maneuver from the sea.  But because of delays in the procurement 
process related to system design and development for the V-22, the service life 
of the CH-46 was extended numerous times forcing the Marine Corps to upgrade 
the avionics, engines, rotors, transmission and more.  All of this at tremendous 
cost to support the changing threat environment and lengthen again the already 
exceeded life-cycle.  This service life extension was not programmed in previous 
DoD budgets nor was it accounted for in the life-cycle costs when the CH-46 was 
originally procured.  In effect, this lack of foresight and initiative has taken money 
from numerous other programs to further fund the CH-46 and ensure that its life-
cycle is extended to support the new time table of the V-22.19 
The final potential issue germane to this discussion relates to the 
availability of funds for defense programs. The constricting effect of non-
discretionary entitlement spending in the federal budget and the size of the 
budget deficit and total national debt directly affect the defense budget. It is the 
largest and most visible portion of discretionary spending and the easiest to 
target.  Because of the current economic situation, defense planners, political 
                                            
19 DIR, 1998, 10. 
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pundits, and congressional leaders all expect that the defense budget must 
contract to meet fact-of-life realities.  If this is in fact the case, the military will be 
left with less budget authority every year to support its activities including 
acquisition programs as well as operations and support of existing hardware.  
The full up-front purchase of goods and equipment to outfit the force may have to 
be reevaluated because of the shortage of available funds.  Anticipating these 
issues, along with working on alternative ways of funding our military and its 
acquisition process is paramount to maintaining a strong defense.  
D. LEASING ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
There are two types of lease programs that bear discussion; the true lease 
and the lease-purchase.  A true lease, or operating lease, has no provision for 
the eventual transfer of the property from the lessor to the lessee. A true lease 
has some distinct advantages.  First, systematic technology replacement of the 
leased equipment allows the user to remain at the forefront of technology.  
Commercial entities, universities, or other government agencies that lease 
equipment to the government have an established life cycle associated with the 
equipment that they provide.  When that life cycle is exceeded, new equipment 
replaces old.  This advantage is only realized on items with a short technological 
lifespan, any large item such as the V-22 would not be subject to this advantage.  
A disadvantage to this replacement in kind system is the burden of keeping track 
of the equipment.  The contractual management of lease agreements is often 
cited as a contributing factor to the government’s reliance on the full up-front 
purchase of equipment.  It is a commonly held belief that dealing with vendors 
from a fleet unit is nearly impossible but there is no supporting evidence to 
support this claim.  There is a system in place to get things done when trying to 
deal directly with a vendor and from experience this process is extremely painful 
and slow but not insurmountable.  For DoD, maintaining accountability of 
thousands of units can be a troublesome task, specifically since each unit is not 
the true owner and a system must be in place to identify where each piece of 
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equipment is.20  There needs to be a better system in place for dealing with 
vendors to correct issues as they arrive to enable the DoD and its users to be 
more responsive to meet demands.  
The second advantage to leasing is that it levels expenditures in relation 
to the budget in the shorter-term and reduces spikes due to unforeseen costs 
related to purchase contracts. Unlike full up-front purchases where large 
expenditures in particular fiscal years create spikes in spending, leases are 
considered operating expenses and therefore spread costs over time. By 
reducing the upfront cost of new programs through leasing, DoD can generate 
substantial cost savings over time. Savings that result from reducing 
procurement delays due to requirements creep, fielding higher quantities to 
spread research and development costs over greater numbers, and placing cost 
schedule and performance risk on the contractor.  The primary disadvantage to 
this is committing to a multi-year contract with one vendor and one technology.  
This could potentially limit the DoD’s ability to deploy in response to emerging 
threats due to legislative mandates, federal requirements, or other unforeseen 
challenges.  DoD cannot become a slave to one vendor and its technology. 
The third advantage to leasing is the level of standardization that is 
established.  A good leasing contract can help the DoD standardize across 
programs or platforms, such as the JSF (Joint Strike Fighter).  This resultant 
savings in staff labor and maintenance costs, as well as improving the operating 
efficiency of the program speaks volumes about the potential cost benefits 
associated with leasing.  Also, maintenance costs will be lowered universally due 
to standardization and the use of new equipment rather than outdated, outlived, 
and unfunded legacy equipment.  The disadvantage to this is that changes and 
modifications must be limited because changes place additional burdens on the 
contract, which in turn will add to the cost of the lease. 
                                            
20 DIR, 1998, 11. 
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One of the biggest advantages is streamlined equipment disposal.  With 
leased equipment, the owner or vendor assumes the responsibility of disposing 
of the equipment.  In DoD’s case this frees up such things as “bone yards” - 
areas where outdated equipment just sits and wastes away.  By getting rid of 
these areas, nothing but land used solely for storage, will free up the equipment 
and personnel assigned to guard and maintain them.  A service performed by 
contracted or military personnel, which in either case takes money, personnel, or 
both away from activities where they could be put to better use.  Not only is this 
old equipment just sitting, not adding any value to the DoD, but the acres of land 
it is sitting on is wasting away as well.  This land could be used to expand our 
ever-shrinking training areas, or sold as offsets to help reduce base costs that 
support these areas.  The disadvantage to this lies in the industry life cycle of 
that equipment. 
DoD will have to be proactive in replacing leased equipment because of its 
reduced life-cycle.  Most equipment has a specific life cycle and by allowing the 
vendors to dictate the length of use, DoD is giving them control of when and how 
our equipment is utilized.  The DoD will have to ensure that every program that is 
leased is monitored to ensure that a replacement is in fact ready and in line for 
transition.  Failure to comply with industry life-cycle measurements will result in 
additional costs, which reduces the beneficial aspects of the lease arrangement.  
Therefore, a very strict, proactive monitoring process to govern leases will have 
to be implemented in order for them to be effective.21 
E. SUMMARY 
In summary, the lease-purchase option is preferable to an operating lease 
in specified circumstances based on the availability of equipment at lease 
termination outweighing the benefit of the ability to cut disposal costs.  
Environmental protection policies in effect at the time of disposal may increase 
these disposal costs such that, depending on what equipment is leased, disposal 
                                            
21 DIR, 1998, 11. 
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costs may change the balance of the accrued benefit.  Leasing does have the 
ability to spread payments over time as an added advantage, again providing a 
















































VI. RULES AND RESTRICTIONS FOR LEASING  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces some of the more important laws and policies in 
place to guide the leasing process.  Specifically it will cover directives from such 
documents and publications as the FAR 7.4 “Equipment Lease or Purchase”, 
DFARRS 207.4 “Equipment Lease or Purchase” and the FMR 7000.14-R 
“Volume 4, to name a few.  It will also provide an analysis of these restrictions 
and what the government expects to see when trying to choose the leasing 
option.   
It will also discuss cost-benefit analysis in relation to leasing and 
purchasing.  This chapter will not go into how to do a cost-benefit analysis or the 
process that goes along with leasing and purchasing.  This section is brief 
because of the numerous calculations and time-consuming nature of cost-benefit 
analysis. 
B. DISCUSSION AND BACKGROUND 
When the DoD does decide to lease its equipment there are actually a lot 
of restrictions that are applied to the leasing option.  This is to ensure that 
nobody gets a raw deal and all business is done with all parties involved.   There 
are many governing directives and some are as follows, FAR 7.4 “Equipment 
Lease or Purchase”, DFARRS 207.4 “Equipment Lease or Purchase”, FMR 
7000.14-R “Volume 4, Chapter 7, Section 070207”, DODI 7041.3 “Economic 
Analysis for Decision Making”, and finally the Circular A-94 “Guidelines and 
Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs.”   
Previous chapters have covered a few of the restrictions and leasing 
guidelines.  What follows is a brief discussion of the cost-effectiveness guidelines 
to be used when conducting lease-purchase analyses, specifically the guidelines 
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established in OMB Circular A-94.  This brief discussion will not go through the 
circular line-by-line, as that is outside the scope of this thesis, and will only cover 
that which is relevant. 
C. GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCTING THE ANALYSIS 
When deciding between leasing and purchasing, the government has a 
strict set of guidelines for conducting the analysis as presented in the previous 
section.  It says: 
Analysis of nominal lease payments should use the nominal 
Treasury borrowing rate on marketable securities of comparable 
maturity to the period of analysis.  Nominal Treasury borrowing 
rates should be taken from the economic assumptions for the 
budget.  A table of these discount assumptions is presented in 
Appendix C of this Circular, which is updated annually.  (Constant 
dollar lease-purchase analysis should use the real Treasury 
borrowing rate, described in the preceding paragraph.) (Circular, 9). 
Essentially, this circular is telling those agencies who are looking to lease 
how to accurately do their cost analysis and what rates to use when figuring the 
different costs incurred with that lease.   
In this circular there is also special guidance for lease-purchasing analysis 
and whether or not this circular’s guidance is germane to the decision.  The first 
question to be asked by the analyst is whether or not this circular applies to the 
lease analysis.  The following questions, if answered yes, would make this 
circular’s guidance applicable (Circular, 12): 
• If the lease-purchase concerns a capital asset (Building, 
equipment, facilities, installations, or land):  
• Is leased to the Federal Government for a term of three or more 
years; or, 
• Is new, with and economic life of less than three years, and leased 
to the Federal Government for a term of 75 percent or more of the 
economic live of the asset; or, 
• Is built for the express purpose of being leased to the Federal 
Government; or,  
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• Is leased to the Federal Government and clearly has no alternative 
commercial use (e.g., a special purpose government installation). 
• The lease-purchase analysis concerns a capital asset or a group of 
related assets whose total fair market value exceeds $1 million.  
If the government decides to lease, there is specific justification required 
for that lease if that lease involves a capital asset.  This justification is provided in 
one of the following three ways: 
• Conduct a separate lease-purchase analysis, which is the only 
acceptable method for major acquisitions. 
• Conduct periodic lease-purchase analysis of recurrent decisions to 
lease similar assets used for the same general purpose.  This 
applies to the entire class of assets.  OMB approval should be 
sought. 
• Adopt a formal policy for smaller leases and submit that policy to 
the OMB for approval.  Following this policy should result in the 
same lease-purchase decision, which would improve efficiency of 
the process. 
What all these have in common is that the government wants to see that 
substantial savings can be realized when leasing versus purchasing.  
D. ANALYTICAL REQUIREMENTS AND DEFINITIONS 
The final restriction placed on the lease-purchase option is the analytical 
requirements and definitions.  Whenever the DoD is seeking to acquire a capital 
asset, it should do so in a way that is least expensive to the government in life-
cycle cost, economic life, and purchase price.  The first, life-cycle cost should 
compare the net discounted present value of leasing to the full costs of 
purchasing that identical asset.  These costs with purchasing include the 
purchase price plus any other ancillary service costs over the expected life of the 
asset discounted back to the present value.  Economic life has to be reviewed 
also when analyzing the lease-purchase option.  The economic life of the asset is 
the remaining or productive lifetime of that asset.  This life begins when the asset 
is acquired and ends when the asset is retired form service. 
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The last and probably the most important analysis that the government 
wants to see is the savings in the purchase price.  The circular says:  “The 
purchase price of the asset for purposes of lease-purchase analysis is its fair 
market value, defined as the price a willing buyer could reasonably expect to pay 
a willing seller in a competitive market to acquire the asset.”22  What this is 
saying is that the final purchase price for that asset may include other things that 
have to be added or subtracted to that price to ensure that the purchase price of 
the asset is not understated.  As an example, if the asset in question were to be 
placed on public land, then the value of that land in the purchase price must be 
included to be equitable. 
E. COST-BENEFIT 
It is hard to know what for sure can be quantified when doing a cost-
benefit analysis, particularly when trying to quantify something that has no dollars 
associated with it.  This is why a cost-benefit analysis can take on several forms, 
but the analyst should always try to consider all of the elements involved in the 
life cycle of the program.  An in depth cost-benefit analysis will ensure that the 
best choice becomes apparent while identifying all of the associated costs. 
A cost-benefit analysis between leasing and purchasing contains a set of 
common items that should be quantified when making a comparison.  Enclosure 
(2) shows those items that, at a minimum, should be included when conducting a 
cost-benefit analysis.  It is up to the individual analyst to include items not on this 
list but deemed necessary for the comparison by virtue of experience or 
instruction.  However, it should be noted that for a cost-benefit analysis to work, 
and savings realized, it must be done as accurately as possible with respect to 
reflecting unquantifiable benefits as costs.   
 
                                            
22 Circular, 14. 
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F. SUMMARY 
As explained, these restrictions are there to ensure that the acquisition 
process performs fairly and that a thorough cost-benefit analysis is done as 
accurately as possible.  In the circular there are a number of other items that 
need to be addressed as well, taxes and ancillary services.  These are just as 
important and should be incorporated into a cost analysis to ensure everything is 
accounted for.  If all done properly then no doubt a fair decision will be made 
when it comes to leasing versus purchasing.  Combine these restrictions with the 
cost-benefit aspect and the result is a lengthy and very complex process that has 
to be done correctly.  Bottom line, the decision whether to lease or purchase 
rests with those individuals making the money decisions based on the needs of 
their agency.  Cost savings from a true lease standpoint will not be realized from 
a simple comparison of prices between equipment.  The savings and efficiencies 
come from the improvements that will be realized during the life of the equipment 
and this has to be accounted for.23  This process is in-depth and should be made 
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VII. EXAMPLE OF LEASE/PURCHASE DECISION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will give an example of a lease/purchase decision that 
worked.  It will briefly discuss the events that took place in the early 1981980s, 
with respect to the Navy looking to replace and acquire tankers for the Military 
Sealift Command Program.  It will provide a brief background of how and why the 
Navy chose to lease this program and asset instead of purchasing it.  It will also 
provide a small analysis of why it worked and give supporting information as to 
why leasing of military equipment could work for all parties involved if done 
properly. 
B. DISCUSSION AND BACKGROUND 
In the early 1980s, the Navy was looking to lease or purchase five 
transport tankers for the Military Sealift Command Program.  This program was 
responsible for transporting fuel for the Department of Defense during peacetime, 
war and other contingencies if needed.  The mission was for a point-to-point 
delivery of refined petroleum products to DoD users throughout the world.  This 
program is a good example of the lease versus buy option.  In 1982, the Navy 
awarded contracts for the long-term lease of five newly constructed T-5 
replacement tankers.   
In the early 1980s the Navy was having some financial difficulties and 
decided to charter or lease, vice buy, the $65 million T-5 tankers.  The charters 
were for twenty-year terms, expiring between FY 2005 and FY 2006, and 
contained purchase options for the T-5 tankers at the end.  How and why did this 
lease-option come to be the way to go? 
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C. BACKGROUND ON MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND 
A little background on how the Military Sealift Command (MSC) functions 
as a business with respect to the Navy.  The MSC uses a yearly budget to 
predict the maintenance and repair costs of its current T-5 tankers.  The 
operating contractor submits a proposed budget based on the last 30 days of 
operations, all of which is historical data on costs and planned maintenance the 
following year.  Personnel from the MSC then review this proposed budget and 
then develop their own estimates.  Once this is complete, the contractor then 
gets into the action and negotiates the final budget through a contract 
modification.  Once this budget is approved, he must submit quarterly reports 
that separate all transactions for the 24 different maintenance and repair 
categories.  In short, if these costs exceed the budget costs the Navy has 
planned for the MSC, they are reimbursed that money.  If the budgeted costs are 
higher then the actual costs, the contractor or Navy will credit the MSC.  This 
factors into the leasing process because it is where the Navy will save the 
majority of its money in leasing versus buying.  
D. REASONS FOR LEASING BY THE NAVY 
The primary reason for the long-term lease was that available 
procurement funds were needed for higher priority combat ships and this type of 
lease allowed it to meet its support requirements without a large upfront 
obligation of procurement funds.  What the Navy assumed was that it could 
spread its payments over the life of the lease, thereby costing less per year, and 
then use its annual O&M appropriations to fund them without an up-front 
obligation.  If the Navy had purchased these ships, funds would have been 
obligated from the Navy’s shipbuilding procurement appropriation.  Had the Navy 
chosen that route, then payments would have to be made before delivery and 
buying would have forced the program to compete for funds with the Navy’s other 
combat ships. 
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The owner of the ships also received a benefit from leasing vice selling.  
The specific leasing arrangements for the T-5 replacement tankers allowed the 
owners of the ship a special tax benefit.  This benefit included an accelerated 
depreciation of the ship’s cost and deductions on interest payments that lowered 
the taxes of the owner.  These tax breaks lead to benefits being passed on to the 
Navy in the form of lower lease payments, which also made leasing a more 
attractive deal.  The down side to these tax benefits was a loss of revenue for the 
treasury department, which could have been used in other programs.   
E. OPPOSITION TO LEASING 
The treasury department did not like losing revenue so they, along with 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), issued joint guidelines for DoD 
leases that specifically talks about special tax benefits conveyed to the ship 
owner.  Basically, if the ship owner received a tax benefit from the lease, then 
that benefit had to be added to the cost of a lease in a lease versus buy analysis.  
There was also more guidance from the OMB about lease agreements, 
specifically, not only should the analysis of the lease versus buy analysis include 
the tax benefit, but the normal payment of taxes on the lessor’s income derived 
from the leases total lease cost may not be subtracted.  Had these guidelines 
been in place when the lease agreement was signed; the analysis would have 
said that purchasing, instead of leasing, was the cheaper alternative.   
What is the overall affect of leasing versus purchasing?  The Navy 
showed that it was saving money and getting their equipment fielded much 
sooner.  Also, they were not spending a lot of up-front money before actually 
receiving the ships, this saved money in the budget for other things.  Specifically, 
the Navy showed that if they buy the ships with the purchase clause at 20 years, 
FY 2003, the would save $479 million over the FY 2003 to FY 2015 as compared 
to buying or continue leasing after 20 years.   
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F. SUMMARY 
The tanker is a prime example of a solution that worked for the Navy in the 
early 1980s.  They proved that they could save their budget and their service 
money and divert much needed attention to other programs by still providing the 
Navy with its much needed support ships.  However, the Treasury Department 
did not like the fact that they were losing revenue and choose to pursue this 
issue. They were able to put in legislation language and restrictions that has 
made leasing an unattractive offer to DoD.  This is a good example of the 
government getting involved in situations that required nothing of them.  It not 
only hurt the DoD in future endeavors, but this is the beginning of the down turn 
in the United States defense industrial base.  Placing more restrictions on leasing 
began to rule out those companies that were new to the defense industry and did 
not have the capital to compete for large contracts.  The DoD, for the first time, 
began to see consolidation as a limiting factor in defense acquisition, because it 
seemed that no other firm or combination of firms could afford to compete with 
Boeing. However, as demonstrated recently with the DoD and congressional 














This thesis provides a detailed analysis of leasing as a viable option to 
purchasing for DoD asset acquisition.  It has reviewed how the budget has 
affected the acquisitions process, what buying and leasing is in the acquisition 
process, the advantages and disadvantages of leasing versus purchasing, and 
the requirement to conduct a thorough cost-benefit analysis in determining which 
to use.  It has also gone into some of the main rules with regard to cost-benefit 
analysis in the A-94 and provided an example of a lease that worked and saved 
money before these rules were put in place. 
This thesis does not conclude with any definite recommendations.  What it 
does attempt to do is show that leasing is and can be a viable option if done 
properly.  It is hoped that this analysis will contribute to greater awareness 
throughout the acquisition world and military leadership that leasing should be 
taken seriously and further studied before placing it aside solely for lack of 
understanding the leasing process. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions of this thesis are presented in the context of the research 
questions posed in Chapter I. 
1. Research Questions: 
a. To What Extent do Current Financial and Managerial 
Policies Affect Leasing, and Would Changing these 
Policies Benefit Both Parties? 
Based on what has been presented, with current financial and 
managerial policies in place against leasing, leasing is not on option for DoD 
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when procuring capital assets.  These onerous restrictions have made leasing an 
exceptionally complicated process, a process that most individuals would rather 
not undertake.  The time and knowledge required to perform the actual cost 
benefit analysis to determine if the lease option would result in a cost savings is 
such that it precludes consideration in all but the most extreme cases.  The 
tanker lease problem is a prime example of a solution that worked for the Navy in 
the early 1981980s proving that leasing has the potential to conserve finite 
budget resources and free acquisition funding for higher priority programs.   
However, the Treasury Department did not like the loss of revenue. 
They, and others, were able to persuade Congress and the President to pass 
legislation that has made leasing far less attractive and viable for DoD.  This is a 
good example of the government involving itself in business decisions that 
required nothing of them.  It has not only hurt the DoD in future acquisition 
endeavors, but also heralded the beginning of a significant downturn in the 
robustness of the United States defense industrial base.  Placing more 
restrictions on leasing ruled out those companies that were new to the defense 
industry and did not have the capital to compete for large contracts.  The DoD, 
for the first time, began to see defense industry consolidation as a limiting factor 
in defense acquisition, nobody could afford to compete with the Boeing’s of the 
world. 
Onerous leasing policies, put in place after the highly visible tanker 
lease, were inevitable.  Politics and the implicit games and trade-offs made in the 
name of serving one’s constituency have a significant impact on the DoD 
acquisition process. Historically, the United States has relied on a procurement 
process that favors the full up-front purchase of supplies and equipment to 
resource defense needs.  Leasing has recently gained resurgence among a 
small minority of observers as an alternative means of acquiring equipment for 
our military.  Individuals who are unfamiliar with and do not like the prospect of 
change are afraid of what could happen if more leasing was done.  Leasing in 
their view subverts their authority to oversee defense spending and provide 
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tangible returns to their constituencies.  These stakeholders have made leasing 
an extremely messy and confusing issue when it comes its use to acquire DoD 
capital assets.   
In short, leasing offers significant advantages in situations where 
commercial markets produce commercial off the shelf assets that meet defense 
needs with little or no modification, the need is of such an urgency that it 
precludes the normal procurement process, or funding for critical combat 
systems removes from consideration support equipment that is necessary but 
otherwise unaffordable.   
b. Are There Any Benefits to Leasing vs. Purchasing?   
In certain specific circumstances leasing offers distinct benefits 
over purchasing.  Leasing offers lower up-front procurement costs allowing more 
critical programs to progress unmolested in the acquisition process.  Leasing 
offers significantly better performance in controlling costs since risk is not 
completely transferred with the property and vendors/contractors are under 
greater pressure to meet cost, schedule, and performance goals.  Since the 
government continues to cling to the notion that owning all of its assets is always 
the best policy, the lease-purchase alternative allows DoD to enjoy the use of an 
asset as it pays for it over the useful life of the asset and, in accordance with 
provisions in the lease, to purchase the assets at some future time at a discount.  
By doing this DoD still maintains the ability to change the asset within the terms 
of the lease.  Otherwise, if previously purchased equipment requires some new 
upgrade, DoD must go back through the whole acquisition and procurement 
process of contracting somebody to do the upgrade.  The leasing option allows 
some flexibility with upgrades because the contract and maintenance are often 
included in the lease.  In this case it is a matter of working out the details of 
effectively completing the upgrade while maintaining combat readiness. 
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Another major reason why the lease-purchase could be better is 
the time it takes to field the asset.  Typically, when equipment is purchased, 
payment is made up front to get the program development started.  Then as the 
barriers to success become more concrete, there are delays as technology 
matures.  Had contractors been more forward in their assessment of 
technological readiness levels they would likely not have bid so low.  This has 
effects downstream as costs are deferred because the contractor knows he will 
get his money from the government.  Under the lease examples researched, the 
contract generally contained provisions that stipulated that the contractor bears 
all of the risk until delivery at which time only a portion of the risk is transferred to 
the government.  Essentially, the contractor does not get paid until the asset is 
delivered and there are significant penalties if the contractor does not deliver on 
time.  
In closing, the lease-buy option is not the perfect answer in all 
situations.  There are significant impediments to leasing as a viable alternative to 
the full up-front procurement of capital assets as demonstrated numerous times 
in this thesis.  But, leasing does have merits that taken in context allow greater 
flexibility and allow DoD to more effectively manage finite resources.  There is 
too much evidence in support of the lease-purchase option to consider otherwise.   
c. Will Leasing Help the DoD in Controlling their Budget?   
Leasing offers many advantages that serve to stabilize cash flows 
over time.  This stability could help the DoD in controlling its budget as explained 
in Chapter IV.  A leveled expenditure, such as leasing in relation to the budget, 
will help to reduce spikes in capital budgets due to unforeseen costs related to 
purchasing contracts.  Leasing in and of itself is considered an operating 
expense and as such costs are spread over time.  This is in contract to the large 
expenditures in particular fiscal years for upgrading hardware due to 
modernization of outdated and obsolete equipment associated with purchasing.  
When these upfront and unexpected costs are reduced, the DoD can begin to 
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realize real cost savings leaving procurement funding for high priority acquisition 
programs.  Of course this is not as simple as it sounds.  Monitoring of all leasing 
contracts will have to be done in perpetuity to ensure accurate reporting is done 
for budgetary purposes.  Lastly, because the lease option avoids much of the 
need for reprogramming money due to cost and schedule overruns, leasing 
provides protection from wild swings in programmatic planning, authorization, 
and spending.  By shifting the burden of risk to a more equitable share between 
government and private sector contractors, a better product can be supplied at a 





















































*IT staff time includes time spent on installation, maintenance, moves/adds/changes, de-
installation, and disposal.  Costs will vary depending on who is responsible for maintenance in 
leasing contracts and on estimates of problem-solving efforts for older installed platforms. 
**Agency staff time includes non-IT staff time spent on processing purchase orders, tracking 
leased equipment, dealing with surplus equipment, etc. 
 
Note:  In the analysis, it is important to use PV (Present Value) calculations to equalize price 
comparisons 
Enclosure (2) 
Purchasing Lease-Purchasing Leasing 
Equipment Price Payments on equipment Lease payments 
Residual value of 
equipment 
Residual value of 
equipment 
N/A 
Maintenance Costs Maintenance Costs Maintenance Costs 
N/A N/A Contracted Maintenance 
Costs 
IT Staff Costs* IT Staff Costs* IT Staff Costs* 
Agency Staff Costs** Agency Staff Costs** Agency Staff Costs** 
Disposal Costs Disposal Costs Disposal Costs 
Lease Cumulative Payments Purchase
Months of Usage $5,000 $50,000
1 $5,000 $5,000 $50,000
2 $5,000 $10,000 $50,000
3 $5,000 $15,000 $50,000
4 $5,000 $20,000 $50,000
5 $5,000 $25,000 $50,000
6 $5,000 $30,000 $50,000
7 $5,000 $35,000 $50,000
8 $5,000 $40,000 $50,000
9 $5,000 $45,000 $50,000
10 $5,000 $50,000 $50,000
11 $5,000 $55,000 $50,000
12 $7,000 $62,000 $50,000
$62,000 $50,000
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